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THE DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
ON OPEN SKIES - HOW CAN WE TAKE
LIBERALIZATION TO THE NEXT LEVEL?
RUWANTISSA ABEYRATNE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

M

R. JEFFREY N. SHANE, Associate Deputy Secretary of the
Department of Transportation, addressing the American
Bar Association's Forum on Air and Space Law on November 8,
2002, gave an aufait interpretation of the much awaited but predictable decision of the European Court on the open skies
agreements between eight European States and the United
States, which had been reported to the Court by the European
Commission for adjudication. At the end of his presentation,
Mr. Shane asked the pertinent question: "How can we take liberalization to the next level?" He then offered some cohesive and
logical scenarios.
There are certain aspects of the European Court's decision
that led to misconception and misinterpretation immediately after the decision. Mr. Shane's presentation was the clearest and
the most accurate interpretation that was given soon after the
decision. This article will attempt to pick salient issues from the
judgment, analyze them from perspectives of both sides of the
Atlantic, and offer the author's personal insight as to "how we
could take liberalization to the next level."
In December 1998, the European Commission applied to the
European Court of Justice for its adjudication of instances
where seven European Union (EU) Member States had concluded bilateral "open skies" agreements with the United States
in the field of air transport.' The court held oral proceedings in
* The author, who is a senior official at the International Civil Aviation

Organization, has written this article in his personal capacity. The opinions
expressed are personal to the author and should not be attributed to ICAO.
I The seven States are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden. An eighth case was brought against the United Kingdom.
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May 2001 and subsequently considered conclusions of the Advocate-General issued on January 31, 2002.2 The European Court
of Justice issued its judgment on November 5, 2002.'
The genesis of contention, insofar as the European Commission was concerned, occurred in 1992 when the Member States
of the EU jointly agreed to create a single European market in
air transport. Broadly, this meant that air carriers of the EU
Member States could carry passengers and freight on an intraEU basis territorially, using liberalized commercial rights. This
decision in limine accorded to European Community airlines
equal rights at law to operate air services from their home bases.
Furthermore, European Community airlines became ipso facto
airlines of the EU with the same rights and on the same terms as
local airlines in any given EU territory.
A natural corollary to this agreement was the Commission's
belief that such a broad initiative to remove trade barriers in
market access would encourage competition among EU carriers
within the Union, particularly because European carriers could
take the benefit of servicing from their home base and establish
commercial operations anywhere in the EU on an equal basis,
regardless of who the carrier may be. More importantly, one
can ascribe to the European Commission a reasonable expectation that the initiative to liberalize would bear the importance of
a common EU external policy toward countries outside the
Union.
Based on the above logic, the Commission took the position
that it would be inconsistent with the aims of liberalization initiatives if Member States were to negotiate and finalize bilateral
agreements pertaining to air transport services with countries
outside the EU. The Commission believed that a concerted sinThe Netherlands joined the respondent States in support as a party to the litigation in October 1999.
2 At the time of writing, the Commission was considering the scope of legal
action against the Netherlands, France, Italy, and Portugal, all of which have
since concluded bilateral agreements with the United States.
3 Case C-466/98 Commission v. United Kingdom [2002] O.J. (C323/1); Case
467/98 Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark [2002] O.J. (C323/2); Case 468/98
Commission v. Kingdom of Sweden [2002] O.J. (C323/3); Case C-469/98 Commission v. Republic of Finland [2002] O.J. (C323/4); Case C-470/98 Commission
v. Hellenic Republic [2002] O.J. (C259/3); Case C-471/98 Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium [2002] OJ. (C323/5); Case C-472/98 Commission v. Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg [2002] O.J. (C323/6); Case C475/98 Commission v. Republic of Austria [2002] O.J. (C323/7); Case C-476/98 Commission v. Federal
Republic of Germany [2002] O.J. (C323/8).
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gle market approach to bilateral negotiations by the EU against
non-EU countries would ensure the pristine equity of a single
European market and effectively preclude unfair competition
from non-EU carriers who may not meet the stringent criteria
that EU airlines must satisfy to gain EU carrier status. Therefore, it was the contention of the Commission that non-EU carriers should be granted market access to territories in the EU only
if such carriers satisfied criteria that were acceptable to the
Union as a whole and not on an individual State-by-State basis.
Another argument adduced by the Commission in support of
the principle that bilateral air services agreements should be negotiated with non-EU States only by the EU and not by individual EU Member States was anchored by the reasoning that if EU
States were to individually allocate air traffic rights in the traditional manner to foreign destinations based on nationality, discrimination against national flag carriers of separate EU
Member State carriers would result, vitiating the treaty provisions that governed the liberalization initiative. The Commission argued cogently that any negotiation based on individual
nationality may hinder competition between EU airlines who
will be constrained to defend and safeguard their national interests. Such a constraint would have far reaching consequences
adversely affecting the overall progress of the European economy and industry. In pursuance of its strong views on individual
bilateral negotiations against an EU-based common approach,
the Commission requested EU Member States to refrain from
entering into any new agreements, particularly with the United
States.
The United States in 1994, issued an "International Aviation
Policy Statement" which advocated a global open aviation system
4
and committed the United States to an "open skies" approach.
The United States open skies policy consisted of a liberalized
bilateral and multilateral structure that would enable carriers to
continue onwards to a third country from a destination (usually
called "Fifth Freedom" rights). For example, in the context of
the United States and Europe, a carrier could operate air services from New York to Paris and onwards to London.
Although the Commission requested EU Member States to
desist from entering into bilateral agreements individually, all
Members States signed open skies agreements with the United
4 International Aviation Policy Statement, 1994, available at http://www.state.
gov/index.html.
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States except the UK- Although agreeing to nationality principles, the US/UK bilateral agreement did not go so far as to conclude an open skies agreement with the US. The major
contention of the Commission against the open skies agreements was that such agreements eroded the fundamental premise that the EU was one large liberalized market. Although
the Commission conceded that open skies agreements may accord benefits to consumers, it believed that the open skies
agreements between the United States and EU Member States
would provide the United States carriers with significant operational benefits in Europe without according reciprocal benefits
to European carriers in the United States. In practical terms,
the Commission claimed that under the agreements, although
American carriers could operate air services from any point in
the United States to any point in Europe, the European carriers
were restricted to operating services to the United States only
from their home bases. Additionally, it was argued that nationality restrictions incorporated in the open skies agreements
would stultify intra-European investment and rationalization.
Therefore, it was the Commission's submission to the European Court that the only reasonable manner in which negotiations with the United States could be carried out was to
approach negotiations as a block so that the leverage of the EU
States could be pooled. The Commission claimed that the pooling approach was being used by EU States in other areas of commercial interaction with non-EU States and that air transport
should be no exception. Thus, the Commission claimed that
only they could negotiate air transport agreements on behalf of
all EU States.
II.

THE DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT
The principles enunciated by the European Court in support
of its judgments in the case of all eight EU States were similar.
Therefore, this article refers to general observations and conclusions of the court, applicable to all eight respondent States.
However, for purposes of analysis and clarity of reference, specific reference will be made throughout the article to the response of the Kingdom of Belgium, the court's approach to the
specific instance of Belgium and the court's decision in the case
of Belgium.
The finding of the court in all cases was that, having negotiated an open skies agreement with the United States, the concerned EU States failed to fulfill the obligations imposed by the

20031

EUROPEAN COURT ON OPEN SKIES

489

treaty.' What is important to note, in order to remove any
doubt or confusion, is that the European Court did not render
invalid the bilateral agreements in question. Nor did the court
admonish the EU States and prohibit them from conducting bilateral negotiations with the United States in the future. The
court, as the Commission claimed, did not have the jurisdiction
to confer competence, on the Commission to conduct air transport negotiations with the United States. Rather this is a right
which only the EU Council of Ministers can confer on the Commission. The court did decide, however, that certain specific
provisions and areas covered in the questioned bilateral agreements were contrary to EU law since they encroached upon internal EU regulations pertaining to non-EU nationals. These
provisions are:
a) provisions pertaining to the allocation of airport slots;
b) provisions governing pricing, or fares and rates of intra-European air services;
c) agreements on computer reservation systems insofar as they
appear as provisions of the open skies agreements in question; and
d) provisions which reserved the right to grant permission under
the open skies agreements only to airlines substantially owned
and effectively controlled by nationals of the EU Member
States that are party to a particular agreement."
The most interesting aspect of the decisions is that the core
element of the bilateral air services agreement-market access involving the award of air traffic rights-was untouched by the
court except in instances where an EU Member had, in its
agreement with the United States, explicitly precluded another
EU Member from operating air services from that Member's territory. For example, Belgium would not be permitted to agree
that Air France would not or could not operate services between
Brussels and New York. This prohibition is entrenched in the
Treaty of Rome, which forms the substance of legislative legitimacy of the EU and incorporates the right of equal national
treatment for all EU Member States. Therefore, if one EU
Member State were to preclude the right of another Member
State's airline from having the right to operate air services to the
United States from the territory of the first EU State, it would
5 Case C-466/98, Commission v. United Kingdom [2002] E.C.R. 1-9427, at
para. 150.
6 Id. at para. 146.
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result in discrimination by the first State against the second
State.
With regard to the ruling of the court on the four elements
mentioned above, the court held that where the allocation of
airport slots is a consideration in a bilateral agreement, provisions pertaining to slot allocation would be contrary to EU law
and therefore invalid.7 It must be noted, however, that this issue
was academic since none of the eight bilateral agreements examined by the court contained provisions pertaining to slot allocation. The court also held that provisions laying down fares
and rates concerning intra-European routes were inconsistent
with EU law, which solely governed pricing of air services within
the EU.8 Similarly, the Court found computer reservation systems (CRS) provisions in bilateral agreements between the
United States and EU Member States unacceptable."
A.

ARGUMENTS OF THE COMMISSION

The European Commission argued that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission was based on the doctrine of implied
powers, enshrined in Article 80 of the EC Treaty.10 The fundamental principle of implied powers is that the existence of Community law on a particular issue would exclude individual States
from deciding separately on the issue. Embodied in the doctrine of implied powers is the notion that Member States would
lose their right to assume obligations with non-Member countries when common rules which could be affected by those obligations come into being. The Commission recalled that the EU
introduced three packages of liberalization of air services, and
that the third package, which came into effect in 1992, was essentially geared toward liberalizing and establishing an internal
European market of air services, calculated to form a complete
deal with regard to market access of air services to EU carriers
on an intra-EU basis. 1 Based on this argument, the Commission contended that negotiation of open skies agreements by
EU Member States with the United States was far beyond the
scope of competence of those States and repugnant to the letter
7 See id. at para. 150.
s See id. at paras. 96-97.

9 Id. at para. 104.
10 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, OJ. (C340)
[hereinafter EC TREATY].
'1 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Aug. 31, 1992, OJ. (C244),
art. 80.
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and spirit of the "third package"'

2

of liberalization.

3

The Com-

mission concluded its arguments that allocation of traffic rights
by nationality effectively prevented competition between EU airlines and unduly restricted aspirant EU airlines from establishing bases in EU States other than their own.
B.

SUBSTANCE OF THE DECISIONS

The decisions of the European Court regarding the various
States were rendered separately, however, they were consistent
in substance. The court observed that, by application lodged at
the Court Registry on December 18, 1998, the Commission of
the European Communities brought an action under Article 169 of the EC Treaty (now Article 226 EC) for a declaration
that, by having individually negotiated, initialed, and concluded,
in 1995, and applied an "open skies" agreement with the United
States of America in the field of transport, the respondent States
had failed to fulfill their obligations under the EC Treaty.' 4 In
particular, it was argued that the respondent States failed to fulfill their obligations under Articles 5 (now Article 10 EC) and 52
(after amendment, Article 43 EC) thereof, and also under secondary law adopted pursuant to that Treaty. 15 The Commission
claimed in the alternative that, insofar as the 1995 agreement
could not be regarded as having radically amended and, thus,
replaced the agreements previously concluded, the respondent
States had failed to comply with its obligations under Article 5 of
the treaty and under secondary law.1 6 The Commission's claim
was based on the idea that this failure occurred because the
States did not rescind those provisions of the previously concluded agreements that were incompatible with the EC Treaty,
especially Article 52 thereof, and the States failed to comply with
12 The "third Package" of liberalization is discussed later in this article.
13 See United Kingdom, E.C.R. 1-9427, at paras. 78-84, 89-97.
14 See id. at paras. 23-24.
15 In particular, Council Regulation No 2407/92 on Licensing of Air Carriers,
July 23, 1992, O.J. (L240) 1; Council Regulation No 2408/92 on Access for Community Air Carriers to Intra-Community Air Routes, July 23, 1992, O.J. (L240) 8;
Council Regulation No 2409/92 on Fares and Rates for Air Services, July 23,
1992, O.J. (L240) 15; Council Regulation No 2299/89 on a Code of Conduct for
Computerized Reservation Systems, July 24, 1989, O.J. (L220) 1, as amended by
Council Regulation No 3089/93, Oct. 29, 1993, O.J. (L278) 1; Regulation No
2299/89 and Council Regulation No 95/93 on Common Rules for the Allocation
of Slots at Community Airports, Jan. 18, 1993, O.J. (L14) 1.
16 United Kingdom, E.C.R. 1-9427, at para. 24.
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secondary law, or had failed to take all legally possible steps to
that end.
Article 84(1) of the EC Treaty (as amended Article 80(1) EC)
provides that the provisions of Title IV, relating to transport, of
Part Three of the Treaty are only applicable to transport by rail,
road, and inland waterway. 17 Paragraph 2 of that article
provides:
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, decide whether,
to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions
may be laid down for sea and air transport.
The procedural provisions of Article 75(l) and (3) shall apply."'
Pursuant to that provision and with a view to the gradual establishment of the internal market in air transport, the Council
adopted three "packages" of measures in 1987, 1990, and 1992,
which were designed to ensure the freedom to provide services
in the air transport sector and to apply the Community's competition rules in that sector. The "third package," adopted in
1992, comprises Regulation Nos. 2407/92, 2408/92, and 2409/
92. Article 1 of Regulation No. 2407/92 concerns requirements
for the granting and maintenance of operating licenses by Member States in relation to air carriers established in the Community.'1 In that respect, Article 3(3) provides that no undertaking
established in the Community is to be permitted within the territory of the Community to carry by air passengers, mail and/or
cargo for remuneration and/or hire, unless the undertaking has
been granted the appropriate operating license.2 0 Under Article 4(1) and (2), a Member State may grant that license only to
undertakings which have their principal place of business and
registered office, if any, in that Member State and, without
prejudice to agreements and conventions to which the Community is a contracting party, which are majority owned and effectively controlled by Member States and/or their nationals.2 '
Regulation No. 2408/92 concerns access for Community air
carriers to intra-Community air routes. According to the definition given in Article 2(b) of this regulation, a Community air
carrier is an air carrier with a valid operating license granted in
EC TREATY, supra note 10, at art. 84(1).
18 Id. at art. 84(2).
19 Council Regulation 2407/92 on Licensing of Air Carriers, 1992, OJ. (L240)
1, art. 1.
17

20

Id. at art. 3.3.

21

Id. at arts. 4(1), (2).
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accordance with Regulation No. 2407/92.22 Article 3(1) of Regulation No. 2408/92 provides that Community air carriers are to
be permitted by the Member State(s) concerned about exercising traffic rights on routes within the Community. 23 Article
3(2), however, introduces the possibility for Member States to
make an exception to that provision in relation to the exercise
of cabotage rights until April 1, 1997.24
Articles 4 to 7 of Regulation No. 2408/92 govern the possibility of Member States imposing public-service obligations on
given routes..2 5 Article 8 permits Member States to regulate the
distribution of traffic between the airports within an airport system without discrimination on grounds of nationality or identity
of the air carrier. 2 Finally, Article 9 permits the Member State

responsible to impose conditions on, limit, or refuse the exercise of traffic rights, in particular when other modes of transport
can provide satisfactory levels of service 27when serious congestion
and/or environmental problems exist.
Article 1 (1) of Regulation No. 2409/92 sets the criteria and
procedures to be applied for the establishment of fares and
rates on air services for carriage wholly within the Community.
Article 1(2) and (3) of that regulation provide:
Without prejudice to paragraph 3, this Regulation shall not
apply:
a) to fares and rates charged by air carriers other than Community air carriers; and
b) to fares and rates established by public service obligation,
in accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92
of 23July 1992 on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes.
Only Community air carriers shall be entitled to introduce new
products or lower fares than the ones existing for identical
products.28
The court observed that, in addition to Regulations 2407/92,
2408/92, and 2409/92, enacted in 1992, the Community legislature adopted other measures in relation to air transport, in par22 Council Regulation 2408/92 on Access for Community Air Carriers to IntraCommunity Air Routes, 1992, O.J. (L240) 8, art. 2(b).
23 Id. at art. 3(1).
24 Id. at art. 3(2).

25
26

Id. at arts. 4-7.
Id. at art. 8.

27 Id. at art. 9.
28 Council Regulation 2409/92 on Fares and Rates for Air Service, 1992, 0.J.

(L240) 15, arts. 1(2), 3.
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ticular Regulations 2299/89 and 95/93.9 The court ruled that,

in accordance with Article 1, Regulation No. 2299/89 applies to
the CRSs to the extent that they contain air transport products
when offered for use and/or used in the territory of the Community, regardless of the status or nationality of the system vendor, the source of the information used, the location of the
relevant central data processing unit, or the geographical location of the airports between which air carriage takes place.3 0
However, Article 7(1) and (2) of the same regulation provides:
a) The obligations of a system vendor under Articles 3 and 4 to 6
shall not apply in respect of a parent carrier of a third country
to the extent that its CRS outside the territory of the Community does not offer Community air carriers equivalent treatment to that provided under this Regulation and under
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 83/91.
b) The obligations of parent or participating carriers under Articles 3a, 4 and 8 shall not apply in respect of a CRS controlled
by (an) air carrier(s) of one or more third country (countries) to the extent that outside the territory of the Community the parent or participating carrier(s) is (are) not
accorded equivalent treatment to that provided under this
Regulation and under Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
83/91.31

Finally, the court observed that it was undisputed that Regulation No. 95/93 also applies to air carriers from non-Member
countries. However, Article 12 of that regulation provides:
Whenever it appears that a third country, with respect to the allocation of slots at airports:
a) does not grant Community air carriers treatment comparable to that granted by Member States to air carriers from
that country; or
b) does not grant Community air carriers de facto national
treatment; or
c) grants air carriers from other third countries more favourable treatment than Community air carriers,
appropriate action may be taken to remedy the situation in respect of the airport or airports concerned, including the suspension wholly or partially of the obligations of this Regulation in
respect of an air carrier of that third country, in accordance with
Community law.
2 United Kingdom, E.C.R. 1-9427, at para. 6.
30 Council Regulation 2299/89 on a Code of Conduct for Computerized Reservation Systems, 1989, O.J. (L220) 1, art. 1.
31 Id. at arts. 7(1), (2).
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Member States shall inform the Commission of any serious difficulties encountered, in law or in fact, by Community air carriers
in obtaining slots at airports in third countries. "2
The court also noted that the documents before the court indicated that, in 1992, the United States had taken the initiative
to offer various European States the possibility of concluding a
bilateral "open skies" agreement. Such an agreement was intended to facilitate alliances between American and European
carriers and conform to a number of criteria set out by the
American Government. The criteria included free access to all
routes, the granting of unlimited route and traffic rights, the
fixing of prices in accordance with a system of "mutual disapproval" for air routes between the parties to the agreement, and
the possibility of sharing codes.3 3
During 1993 and 1994, the United States intensified its efforts
to conclude bilateral air transport agreements under the "open
skies" policy with European States. In a letter sent to Member
States on November 17, 1994, the Commission drew their attention to the negative effects that such bilateral agreements could
have on the Community, and stated its position that bilateral
agreements were likely to affect internal Community legislation.3 4 It added that negotiation of such agreements could be
carried out effectively, and in a legally valid manner, only at
Community level.
In the case of the Kingdom of Belgium, during the negotiations held on February 28 and March 1, 1995, representatives of
the Belgian and American governments reached a consensus on
a new amendment of the 1980 Agreement, which was subsequently confirmed by an exchange of diplomatic notes. The following amendments were made ("the 1995 amendments") to
the body of the text to the 1980 Agreement: Articles 1 (Definitions), 3 (Designation and Authorization), 6 (Safety), 7 (Aviation Security), 8 (Commercial Opportunities), 9 (Customs
Duties and Taxes), 10 (User Charges), 11 (Fair Competition),
12 (Pricing), 13 (Surface Transportation/Intermodal Services),
14 (Commissions), 15 (Enforcement), 17 (Settlement of Disputes) and 20 (Multilateral Agreement). These provisions
amended or revoked the old provisions in order to make the
32

Council Regulation 95/93 on Common Rules for the Allocation of Slots at

Community Airports, 1993, O.J. (L14) 1, at art. 12.
33 United Kingdom, E.C.R. 1-9427, at para. 16.
34 Id. at para. 19.
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agreement comply with the American open skies model agreement. In addition, Annexes I and II to the 1980 Agreement,
containing schedules of routes and opportunities for their use,
were amended to bring them into line with the model agreement (for example, to routes, operational flexibility, charter
flights, etc.).
Article 3 of the 1980 Agreement makes the granting by each
contracting party of the appropriate operating authorizations
and the necessary technical permissions to airlines designated
by the other party subject to the condition that a substantial part
of the ownership and effective control of that airline be vested
in the party designating the airline, nationals of that party, or
both. According to Article 4, those authorizations and permissions may be revoked, suspended, or limited where the above
condition is not fulfilled.
Based on the above information, the court found that governments submit that the bringing of the present action constitutes
a misuse of procedure because the Commission is attempting to
secure a Community competence for which it was unable to obtain recognition at the Council level, and which it can secure
only by taking action against that institution. In the alternative,
in the case of Belgium, the Belgian Government submitted in its
rejoinder that the present action infringes the legitimate expectation which the Kingdom of Belgium derived from the common declaration of 1996. That declaration was made after the
sending of the letter of formal notice ofJune 2, 1995, and it was
clear that the procedure for failure to fulfill its obligations,
which had been initiated against it, would not be pursued.
The court noted that the action by the European Commission
was for a declaration that the eight respondent States had failed
to fulfill their obligations under Community law by concluding
bilateral agreements separately with the United States in the
field of air transport. On a preliminary finding, the court observed that, by bringing this action for failure to fulfill obligations in accordance with Article 169 of the Treaty, the
Commission had properly applied the Treaty rules, since it had
chosen the proceedings specifically envisaged by the Treaty for
cases where it considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill
one of its obligations under Community law.
In regard to the Belgian Government's argument concerning
the Commission's motives in choosing to bring the present action, the court reminded itself that, in its role as guardian of the
Treaty, the Commission alone is competent to decide whether it
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is appropriate to bring proceedings against a Member State for a
declaration that it has failed to fulfill its obligations. 5 The court
subsequently held that this plea must therefore be rejected. In
the plea submitted in the alternative by the Belgian Government, it should be pointed out that, pursuant to Article 42(2) of
the Court's Rules of Procedure, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings, unless it is based on matters
of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure. The plea alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations was first raised in the rejoinder
and is not based on matters of law or of fact which came to light
in the course of the proceeding. Therefore, this plea should not
proceed.
C.

FINDINGS OF THE COURT

The court found that, in relation to air transport, Article
84(2) of the Treaty merely provides for a power for the Community to take action.3 This power is dependent upon a prior decision of the Council. Accordingly, although that provision may
be used by the Council as a legal basis for conferring on the
Community the power to conclude an international agreement
in the field of air transport, the court found that the provision
could not be regarded as establishing, by itself, an external
Community competence in that field. v
The court conceded that it had previously held that the Community's competence to enter into international commitments
may arise not only from express conferment by the Treaty, but
also by implication from provisions of the Treaty.3 8 Nonethe-

less, such an implied external competence existed not only
whenever the internal competence had already been used in order to adopt measures for implementing common policies, but
also if the internal Community measures were adopted only on
the occasion of the conclusion and implementation of the international agreement. Thus, the competence to bind the Community in relation to non-Member countries may arise by
implication from the Treaty provisions establishing internal
competence, provided that participation of the Community in
35 See C-431/92, Commission v. Germany, [1995] E.C.R. 1-2189, at para. 22.
M See United Kingdom, E.C.R. 1-9427, at paras. 46-52.

37 Id. at para. 52.
38 Id. at para. 47.
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the international agreement is necessary for attaining one of the
39
Community's objectives.

In a subsequent opinion, the court stated that the hypothesis
envisaged in Opinion 1/76 is that where the internal competence may be effectively exercised only at the same time as the
external competence,4 ° the conclusion of the international
agreement is necessary to attain objectives of the Treaty that
cannot be attained by establishing autonomous rules. However,
it was the opinion of the court that this was not the situation in
the case at bar. There was nothing in the Treaty to prevent the
institutions from arranging, in the common rules laid down by
them, concerted action in relation to the United States. Nor was
there anything to prevent the institution from prescribing the
approach to be taken by the Member States in their external
dealings, which would mitigate any discrimination or distortions
of competition which might result from the implementation of
the commitments entered into by certain Member States with
the United States under "open skies" agreements. It has, therefore, not been established that, by reason of such discrimination
or distortions of competition, the aims of the Treaty in the area
of air transport cannot be achieved by establishing autonomous
rules.
The Court also observed that, in 1992, the Council had been
able to adopt the 'third package,' which, according to the Commission, achieved the internal market in air transport based on
the freedom to provide services, without it having appeared necessary at the time to have recourse.4 ' On the contrary, the documents before the court showed that the Council, which the
Treaty entrusts with the task of deciding whether it is appropriate to take action in the field of air transport and to define the
extent of Community intervention in that area, did not consider
it necessary to conduct negotiations with the United States at
Community level. 42 It was not until June 1996, and therefore
subsequent to the exercise of the internal competence, that the
Council authorized the Commission to negotiate an air transport agreement with the United States. The Council granted a
restricted mandate, while ensuring that in its joint declaration
with the Commission of 1996, the system of bilateral agreements
39 See Opinion 1/76, paras. 3, 4.
Opinion 1/76 (citing Opinion 1/94, para. 89).
41 See United Kingdom, E.C.R. 1-9427, at paras. 4-5.
42 See Opinion 1/76, at para. 18.
40
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with that country would be maintained until the conclusion of a
new agreement binding the Community. 3
The court, therefore, concluded that the finding with regard
to internal competence cannot be called into question based on
the fact that the measures adopted by the Council in relation to
the internal market in air transport contain a number of provisions concerning nationals of non-Member countries." Contrary to what the Commission maintains, the relatively limited
character of those provisions precludes the inference that the
freedom to provide services in the field of air transport in favour
of nationals of the Member States is inextricably linked to the
Community treatment of nationals of non-Member countries, or
in non-Member countries to nationals of the Member States.
In the opinion of the court, this case, did not disclose a situation in which internal competence could effectively be exercised
only at the same time as external competence. In light of the
foregoing considerations, it was the court's view that the Community could not validly claim that there was an exclusive external competence to conclude an air transport agreement with
that country.45
The court next considered the Commission's submission that
the clause on the ownership and control of airlines is contrary to
Article 52 of the Treaty. The States do not accord to the nationals of other Member States, and in particular to airlines and undertakings of those Member States established in the case
concerning the Kingdom of Belgium. An example of this lack
of accordance is the treatment reserved for Belgian nationals.
The Belgian Government had submitted that the clause on
the ownership and control of airlines did not fall within the
scope of Article 52 of the Treaty. Belgium contended that the
clause did not relate to the freedom of establishment, but instead to the right of air carriers to offer services in non-Member
countries since it regulated the exercise of traffic rights to points
situated in non-Member countries. Moreover, by virtue of that
clause, refusal of an airline designated by the Kingdom of
Belgium would be an act of the United States.
All respondent States are of the view that, whereas Article 61
of the EC Treaty (after amendment Article 51 EC) precluded
the Treaty provisions on the freedom to provide services from
43
44
45

Id. at paras. 19-20.
See, e.g., id. at paras. 12-14.
United Kingdom, E.C.R. 1-9427, at paras. 55-58.
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applying to transport services, the latter being governed by the
provisions of the title concerning transport, there was no article
in the Treaty that precluded its provisions on freedom of establishment from applying to transport.46
Article 52 of the Treaty, in particular, applies to airline companies established in a Member State which supply air transport
services between a Member State and a non-Member country.4 7
All companies established in a Member State within the meaning of Article 52 of the Treaty are covered by that provision,
even if its business in that State consists of services directed to
non-Member countries.48
In regard to the question whether the Kingdom of Belgium
has infringed on Article 52 of the Treaty, it should be borne in
mind that, under that article, freedom of establishment includes
the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings. Such undertakings include companies or firms within the meaning of the
second paragraph of Article 58 of the EC Treaty (now the second paragraph of Article 48 EC) under the conditions laid down
for its own nationals by the legislation of the Member State in
which establishment is effected.
Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty guarantee nationals of Member States of the Community who have exercised their freedom
of establishment, and companies or firms which are assimilated
to them, the same treatment in the host Member State as that
accorded to nations of that Member State. 49 This includes access to an occupational activity on first establishment and the
exercise of that activity by the person established in the host
Member State.
The court recognized that it has held that the principle of
national treatment requires a Member State which is a party to a
bilateral international treaty with a non-Member country, to
avoid double taxation by granting to permanent establishments
of companies resident in another Member State the advantages
provided for by that treaty on the same conditions as those

Id. at para. 122.
See id. at para. 118.
48 See id.
49 Case C-307/97, Saint-Gobain v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt,
E.C.R. 1-6161, at para. 35.
46
47

[1999]
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which apply to companies resident in the Member State that is
party to the treaty.50
The court, therefore, viewed the clause on the ownership and
control of airlines as, amongst other things, permitting the
United States to withdraw, suspend, or limit the operating licenses or technical authorizations of an airline designated by a
Member of the EU, but of which a substantial part of the ownership and effective control is not vested in that Member State or
its nationals. 5 ' The court also stated that there can be no doubt
that airlines established in an EU Member State of which a substantial part of the ownership and effective control is vested, either in a Member State other than that State or in nationals of
that State ("Community airlines"), are capable of being affected
by that clause.52 By contrast, the formulation of that clause
shows that the United States is, in principle, under an obligation
to grant the appropriate operating licenses and required technical authorizations to airlines of which a substantial part of the
ownership and effective control is vested in the EU States
concerned.
The court followed its argument that Community airlines may
always be excluded from the benefit of the air transport agreement between an EU Member State and the United States while
that benefit is assured to airlines of that State. Consequently,
Community airlines suffer discrimination which prevents them
from benefiting from the treatment which the host Member
State accords to its own nationals. Contrary to what a respondent State of the EU may maintain, the court found that the
direct source of that discrimination was not the possible conduct of the United States, but instead the clause on the ownership and control of airlines, which specifically acknowledges the
right of the United States to act in that way.53
III.

LEGAL ISSUES
A.

EUROPE

Air transport in the European Community is fundamentally
regulated by two treaties, the Treaty which establishes the Euro50 See id. at para. 59; Case C-55/00 Gottardo v. INPS, [2002] E.C.R. 1-413, at
para. 32 (judgment of Jan. 15, 2002).
5' United Kingdom, E.C.R. 1-9427, at para. 121.
52 Id. at para. 124.
53 Id. at para. 123.
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pean Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty")54 and the
Treaty which establishes the European Economic Community
("EEC Treaty"). 55 The ECSC Treaty, which was signed in Paris
in 1951, addresses issues related to the carriage of coal and steel
through the media of rail, road, and inland waterways and,
therefore, is not directly relevant to aviation. The EEC Treaty
on the other hand, concerns issues relating to all modes of
transport in the carriage of persons and goods and is, therefore,
of some relevance to aviation.
The EEC Treaty, which was signed in Rome on March 25,
1957, has at its core a Common Transport Policy (CTP) concept
which is calculated to achieve the fundamental purposes of the
European Community.5" One of the most salient features of the
EEC Treaty is that the tasks of the Community are set out succinctly in Article 2 of the Treaty, which provides for the adoption of a CTP as provided for in Article 3(1) of the Treaty.5 7
This provision is linked to Article 74, which in turn provides that
the objectives of the Treaty in relation to issues of transportation
would be pursued by State parties within the parameters of the
CTP, which is established by the Council of Europe through secondary legislation.58
The rights and duties of the Council of Europe in establishing
the CTP, particularly in the fields of air and maritime transport
can be attributed to a 1986 case59 and to Article 189 of the EEC
Treaty. Article 189 admits the Council to adopt measures such
as common rules attributable to the following: (1) international
transport to or from the territory of a Member State or passing
across the territory of one or more Member States; (2) the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport
services within a Member State; and (3) any other appropriate
provisions.'
Under Article 84(1) of the EEC Treaty, the provisions of the
title of the section relating to transport apply to railroad and
54 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, available at
http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc29.htm.
55 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
56 The word "Community" alludes to the European Economic Community,
which is now called the European Community consequent to the signing of the
Treaty of the European Union on November 1, 1993.
57 EEC TREATY, supra note 55, at art. 2.
58 Id. at art. 74.
59 Case 18/83, European Parliament v. EC Council, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 138.
-0EEC TREATY, supra note 55, at art. 189.

2003]

EUROPEAN COURT ON OPEN SKIES

503

inland waterway." Article 84(2) gives discretion to the Council
to decide whether, to what extent, and by what procedure, appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport.6 2 Although explicit mention of air and maritime transport
is made in Article 84, implicit in the Treaty is the understanding
that the transport title will not apply to the two modes of transport. The applicability of the Treaty to air and maritime transport was examined in some detail in the 1974 case of Commission
63 In that case the court observed:
v. France..
Whilst under Article 84(2), therefore, sea and air transport, so
long as the Council has not decided otherwise, is excluded from
the rules of Title V Part Two of the Treaty relating to the CTP, it
remains, on the same basis as other modes of transport, subject
to the general rules of the Treaty.6 4
The court subsequently confirmed this view in a later case decided in 1977. 65 Both the 1974 and 1977 decisions make it incontrovertible that the general rules of the Treaty apply to
transportation. This is provided that the Council, acting under
Article 84(2), does not decide to the contrary. This essentially
means that the Commission has upon it a legal duty 6 6 as well as a
political duty67 to ensure that the general provisions of the
Treaty are applied to air and maritime transportation.
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) is a supplemental
treaty which embellishes the provisions of the EEC Treaty, particularly by adding that the Council shall lay down measures to
improve transport policy, in addition to its duties under Article
75(1) .68 The TEU also laid down the principle that the Council
is obligated in all instances to act on proposals from the Commission, consequent to obtaining the opinion of the European
Parliament."9 The TEU merely enforced the need for the Council to act according to the provision. The TEU also requires that
the European Community should contribute to the establish61
62

Id. at art. 84(1).
Id. at art. 84(2).

Case 167/73, Commission v. France, [1974] E.C.R. 359.
Id. at 367.
65 Case 156/77, EC Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, [1978] E.C.R. 1881
(judgment of Oct. 12, 1977).
- Article 175 of the EEC Treaty addresses issues pertaining to recourse for
failure to act. See EEC TR EArx, supra note 55, at art. 175.
67 As per the powers of the European Parliament provided for in Articles 137
to 144 of the EEC Treaty. Id. at arts. 13744.
6C See Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, 1 C.M.L.R. 719.
') This procedure is laid out in Article 189C of the EEC Treaty.
63

C-
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ment and development of trans-European networks in the fields
of transport, telecommunications, and energy infrastructures.7 0
In October 1997, the Joint European Council confirmed the
creation of a European Common Aviation Area (ECAA), which
would encompass the European Community States, Member
States of the European Economic Area (EEA), and the Associated States of Central Europe. The common aviation area is
based on the Acquis Communautaire in air transport and is
founded in a multilateral agreement which contains transitional
provisions on market access and environmental protection with
particular emphasis on noise. European Community legislation
is extended by the ECAA Agreement in areas relating to market
access and ancillary issues, competition rules, air traffic management, safety, environmental protection, social aspects, and consumer protection.
The perceived dichotomy of wide ranging powers of the European Union in terms of its external relations in air transport and
the inhibitions cast upon the Union by the seminal legislative
instrument, the Treaty of Rome,71 (EEC Treaty) by not explicitly
granting the Union competence, has led to sustained examination by the adjudicatory process. The European Court ofJustice
(ECJ) in 1971 decided that the Community has both external
competence and internal competence on an intra-Europe basis.
This judgment gave implicit external competence to the European Union to take over control of negotiations on behalf of
European Member States in matters relating to international air
transport agreements. Although this implicit right has not been
used by the European Union extensively, it was indeed used in
the 1990s when the European Community adopted internal
rules pertaining to computer reservations systems (CRSs) on an
intra-Europe basis. This right does not, however, extend to
trade in services, on the basis of a 1994 ECJ judgment which
decided that trade in services, including trade relating to air
transport services, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Union.
With the advent of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992,72 which provided that the European Community could decide to cooperate
with third countries to promote projects of mutual interest, it
was possible to encompass the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe within the purview of the European Union. This Treaty
70

Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, 1 C.M.L.R. 719, art. 129b(1).

71 See EEC TREATY, supra note 55.
72

Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, 1 C.M.L.R. 719.
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extended some flexibility to the rigid treaty law governing Europe, particularly in relation to trade in services and commercial
competition in air transport. In January 1993, when the third
and final phase (third package) of European Community air
transportation liberalization took effect, regulations were in
place covering areas such as market access, slot allocation, and
scheduling.
1.

Competition Within Europe

The tightly woven Pan European legislation on competition
reflects the desire of the European nations to band together as a
collective force, rather than compete individually with other nations or among themselves, in the field of air transport. The
combined European markets rank third world wide and, from
1996 to 2000 it was expected that European air carriers would
be responsible for approximately 8% of world aviation in passenger kilometers.73 Although a combined Europe is more
populated than North America, airlines of the European Union
countries have not optimized this potential market primarily
due to their high operating costs. A few airlines were on top,
such as British Airways, KLM, and Lufthansa in the mid-1990s,
while most other European carriers were operating at below
break-even levels. 74 However, as a result of the rapidly evolving
collectiveness of the European States and their competitive
banding together, particularly in the liberalization of intra-European markets, European Union carriers have now entered more
intra-European routes, and several airlines of European States
have established subsidiaries in other Union Member States.
The success of the European Union States, in tightening its
air transport legislation and in liberalizing air transport intraEurope, is a classic example of the "cluster" theory which is
based on the competitive advantage of a cluster of nations which
are geographically proximate to each other. In this case, the air
carriers of a cluster of European States, interconnected and
linked by commonalities and complementaries, are given the
opportunity of forming alliances, sourcing their capital, goods,
and technology to locate their operations within the European
continent wherever it may be cost effective. The prevalence of
clusters in economies, as against isolated competition, brings to
bear new concepts about national, municipal, and international
73 ASS'N OF EUROPEAN AIRLINES YEARBOOK
74

Id. at 15.

19 (1996).
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economies, and opens a whole new dimension of competition
centered around liberalization on an intra-continental legal
structure.
Clustering European air transport in areas of slot allocation
and market access has created new management agendas for European carriers, giving them a tangible stake in key business areas such as taxation, utility cost sharing, and wages. The
European Union States, in their macroeconomic vision, have
created a driving force in the European air transport industry,
not only by maximizing air transport potential within the continent, but also by creating new types of dialogues between air
transport enterprises within Europe.
The essential theory of clustering is founded upon the interaction of economic potential of a group of enterprises. Clusters
of European airlines operating within Europe would affect competition by increasing the productivity across the board of constituent partners. This is done by increasing the capacity of
commercial partners' innovation and growth in productivity,
and by stimulating new business strategies that expand business
as well as the dimensions of the cluster. Clusters also effectively
maximize economies of agglomeration by promoting proximity
of operation while minimizing costs and increasing proximity to
markets.
With the overall thrust of the cluster phenomenon in Europe
brought about by tight legislation on liberalization, European
nations also have the advantage of the immense capacity of their
air transport industry to innovate and upgrade. Europe has retained a competition advantage within the continent through a
highly localized process.
2.

Competition Outside Europe

For the European Union nations, the most important market
is arguably the North Atlantic air transport market between the
United States and Europe. A primary commercial tool which
European carriers have used in participating in this market is
the air carrier alliance. The North Atlantic market was by far
the largest in the world in the mid-1990s, with 34 million passengers carried in 1993. 75 The largest country pair in this market
75 U.S. Int'l Air Passenger & Freight Statistics, 1993 Vol. 1, No. 5, Washington
(1994) at 21.
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link is United States-United Kingdom, which accommodated
43% of all United States-Europe traffic in 1997. 76
Although post-war trends of Bermuda I and Bermuda II bilateral understandings, which had certain restrictions on capacity
and tariffs, were perceived as inhibiting the hidden potential in
air transport between the United States and Europe, the United
States external aviation policy of liberalization, which was
launched in 1978, paved the way for more competition between
the two. The Netherlands, which blazed the trail with the first
liberalized bilateral in 1978 with the United States,7 7 was followed by Belgium 7 and Germanyl in quick succession.
One of the most significant commercial considerations, which
has sometimes been a contentious issue with regard to trans-Atlantic air transport, has been the extra-territorial application of
European Union and United States competition law. Understandably, both the Union and the United States have explicit
policy pertaining to air transport, which is carried out by legislation. It is not unusual, therefore, that the laws applicable to
trans-national air transport may be questioned by either side as
being extra-territorial. Such a contention does not necessarily
reflect malafides on the party against whom extra-territoriality is
alleged. The question of extra-territorial application of national
laws usually arises in instances where in the absence of an international framework of competition rules, the extra-territorial
application of national competition laws is perceived to be necessary to patch loopholes emerging from the territorial reach of
national jurisdiction.
The United States has, through its courts, applied United
States antitrust laws to commercial activities conducted outside
the United States if such activities impinged upon the equilibrium of commercial activities within the United States by having
a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect within the

76 U.S. InternalAir Passenger & Freight Statistics, 1998 Vol., 1 No. 8, Washington
(1998) at 32.
77 See Amendment of March 31, 1978 (1123 U.N.T.S. 345; T.I.A.S. No. 8988) to
the Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States and
the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, April 3, 1957 (410 U.N.T.S.
193; T.I.A.S. No. 4787).
78 U.S.-Belgium Agreement, T.I.A.S. No. 9231.
79 See Bartkowski & Byerly, Forty Years of US.-Cerman Relations 46 Zeitschrfii Fr
Luflund Weltraumrecht, GERMAN JOURNAL OF AIR & SPACE LAw, 1, 3, 8 (1997).
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country.8 0 The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of
19821 grants the United States courts jurisdiction over aspects
of foreign conduct, and also grants the United States Department of Transportation jurisdiction over air routes between the
United States and a foreign country, including routes which are
entirely outside the United States, if competition on such routes
is reasonably likely to have an adverse effect on the United
States. As a result of this legislative possibility, courts in the
United States have jurisdiction over antitrust actions brought by
private entities in a court in the United States even where such
2
actions may concern foreign entities.1
In a laudable and fair attempt to harmoniously balance the
stringent application of United States law to foreign conduct
with external cooperation, the United States enacted the 1994
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, which
broadly admits to arrangements with foreign authorities to investigate antitrust violations through the exchange of information and through common and reciprocal retrieval of evidence.
European Union rules on extra-territoriality are not explicit
and, therefore, are not incorporated in the competition provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. Although, at best
an inference may be drawn from an interpretation of these provisions and extra-territoriality may be imputed to the provisions,
the European Court of Justice in the 1988 Wood Pulp case 3 applied the principle of lex situs to jurisdiction. The court held
that the place where the anti-competitive arrangements take effect determines the jurisdiction of the Union in matters relating
to competition.
Since Article 87 of the EEC Treaty requires appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in
Articles 85 and 86, it flows logically that implementing legislation is necessary to give effect to Articles 85 and 8684 in the instance of issues arising from air transport in routes between the
80 United States v. Aluminium Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See also
Ludwig Weber, Modern Trends in the Antitrust/Competition Law Governing the Aviation Industry, 22 AIR & SPACE LAW 101 (1995).
s Also known as the Sherman Act. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994).
82 See Weber, supra note 80, at 103.
83 Ahistrom v. Commission, ("Wood Pulp") (1988) reported in Giemulla, European Airlaw, The Hague, at c.4a (1997).
84 Article 86 of the EEC Treaty provides that in certain circumstances, any
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market, or in a substantial part of it, shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market, insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.
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European Union and a third country, or in routes that are entirely outside the European Community. Mention must be
made in this regard to the case of Ahmed Saeed.85 The German
Federal Court of Justice sought the ruling of the European
Court of Justice on a matter pertaining to the selling of air tickets to the German public at prices below the approved level by
the Federal Minister of Transport, in contravention of local German municipal law. The issue was whether Article 86 of the
EEC Treaty had overriding jurisdiction over local laws of Union
States. The ECJ held that Article 86 is directly applicable in national courts, even in the absence of implementing legislation.
B.

UNITED STATES

Foreign investment has caused much less political upheaval in
the United States than in Europe. The United States had been,
until the 1980s, a strong net exporter of capital and had little to
fear from foreign influence in trade issues within the country.
In the early 1970s, however, with the burgeoning oil crisis, petro
dollars were invested in the United States leading to a 38.3%
and 22.3% increase in foreign direct investment in 1973 and
1974 respectively. s 6 This figure can be contrasted with a 6% increase on average in the decade between 1962 and 1972.87 This
quantum leap in foreign investment caused grave concern in
Congress and led to a national inquiry which called for measures affecting foreign investors in the United States. The 27
volume and 9,000 page report, which comprehensively described the regulations facing foreign investors, concluded that
a sufficient number of sectors were appropriately regulated, and
recommended that substantial change to the existing policy was
unnecessary.8 8
Unlike its neighbor, Canada, which has a comparably restrictive foreign investment policy, the United States has a liberal
"open door policy" on foreign direct investment and is one of
85 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen & Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. Zentrale zur Bekdmpfung unlauteren Wettebewerbs E.V., [1989] E.C.R. 803, [1990]
4 C.M.L.R. 102.
86 Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Report of the Secretary of
Commerce to the Congress in Compliance with the Foreign Investment Study Act
of 1974 (1976), infra note 88, at 34.
87 Id.
88 Foreign Direct Investment Study Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 786 (1982); U.S.
Dept. of Comm. Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Repol of the Secretary of

Commnerce to the Congress in Compliance with the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974,
(1976).
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the most open economies in this respect. The United States International Investment Policy Statement of 1983 confirmed:
The United States has consistently welcomed foreign direct investment in this country. Such investment provides substantial
benefit to the United States... We provide foreign investors fair,
equitable and non-discriminatory treatment under our laws and
regulations. We maintain exceptions to such treatment only as
far as necessary to protect our security and related interests
which are consistent with our international legal obligations. 89
The United States has adopted the approach that the absence
of regulation encourages investment and is beneficial to the
United States economy.' ° The United States has, therefore, generally adopted a non-discriminatory treatment approach for foreign investors. 9 ' A commentator adds:
Foreign nationals and companies are treated as favourably as nationals or companies of the United States with respect to the establishment and operation of enterprises in this country...
Further, on the basis of the national treatment principal investors from other countries can generally make investments in this
92
country on the same legal terms as American investors.
The "open door policy" and national treatment principle,
however, does not reflect an accurate picture of the status of
foreign investment in the United States. In contrast to what the
"open door policy" is perceived to be, there are numerous laws
that effectively preclude this policy from taking full effect, thus
impeding foreign investments in the country. An example of
this inhibitive approach is the 1988 "Exon-Florio Amendment"
which provided the President with broad powers to review investments of foreign investors on his own initiative for any reason, including those which directly or indirectly affect national
89 International Investment Policy Statement 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1214
(Sept. 1983), cited in J. Raby, The Investment Provisions of the Canada-UnitedStates
Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT'L 395, 400 (1990).
90 See generally, E.M. Graham & P.R. Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the
United States, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International (2d ed. 1989).
91 The United States is limited by its Constitution and by the treaty provisions
governing the country in its capacity to regulate foreign investment. There are
built-in guarantees that are offered to foreign investors in the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (FCN), and the OECD Code of Liberalization of
Capital Movements, which have a direct effect on the United States legal system,
and the guarantee of due process and non-discrimination entrenched in the
United States Constitution.
92 H. E. Bale Jr., The United States Policy Towards Inward Foreign Direct Investment,
18 V. &J. TRANS. - NAT'L L. 199, 207 (1985).
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security. Additionally, the President may also review a foreign
investment following the complaint of a third party. 3
Investors may, by their own volition, serve notice on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). In
addition, the CFIUS can also decide to inquire into an investment by itself. The CFIUS then advises the President of its decision with regard to an investment and the President ultimately
decides whether the investment is contrary to national security
interests. The notion of "national security" is ambivalent in this
context, lacking a precise definition. Consequently, the Executive Branch has great discretion in the implementation of the
Act. The Act is used infrequently and each case is evaluated
individually. 4
In addition, many other sectors which operate through a
fixed maximum level of foreign participation are excluded from
foreign investor participation entirely or partially. These restrictions are seen at the federal level in the fields of communications, 9 5 transportation,9' aviation,9 7 energy and national
resources,98 banking,9" and defense.t 0° Federal laws such as anti93 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100418, 102
Stat. 1107 (1989); seeJ.A. Knee, Limiting Abuse of Exon-Florio by Takeover Targets, 23
GEO. WASH.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 475 (1989). See also M. Sandstrom & C. Coccuza,
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: An Overview, 3 REv. INT'L Bus.
L. 65 (1989); M. Prichard, Status of the Omnibus Trade Bill and the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement, 2 REV. INT'L Bus. L. 95 (1988).
94 On February 1, 1990, President Bush issued an order, based on the ExonFlorio Amendment, to the China National Technology Import and Export Corporation to divest its holdings in MAMCO, a United States manufacturer of aircraft components. MAMCO was a firm that fabricated custom made metal
components for the use of manufacturing civilian aircraft and helicopters. SeeJ.
Mendenhall, Recent Developments: U.S. Executive Authority to Divest Acquisitions Under
the Exon-Florio Amendment - the MAMCO Divestiture, 32 HARV. J. INT'L L. 285, 294
(1991). See also D.S. Nance & J. Wasserman, Regulation of Imports and Foreign
Investment in the United States on National Security Grounds, 11 MiC.H. J. INT'L L. 926
(1990) for a discussion of Presidential powers on the regulation of foreign investments on national security grounds.
95 The Federal Communications Commission may refuse to grant a broadcasting license if the corporation applying for the licence is owned by foreigners and
if it is in the national interest to refuse the grant of such licence. See Federal
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 734 (1976).
96 Jones Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 802 (1976) amended by Supp. V. (1981).
97 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976) amended by Supp. V. (1981).
98 Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133, 2134 (1982); Mineral Leasing Act, 30
U.S.C. § 22 (1982); Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1978). See also P. Scarborough, The Foreign Investor in the United States:
Disclosure, Taxation and Visa Laws, 19 INT'L LAWYFR 85, 94 (1985).
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trust regulations contained in the Clayton Act of 1981,101 which
prohibit direct or indirect acquisition of shares of a company
when it would affect or lessen competition in such a way as to
promote the creation of a monopoly, and the Sherman Act of
1981,02 which prohibits monopolies created by contract, conspiracy, or other ways that restrain trade, may also bring to bear
serious effects on the foreign investors' investments in the
United States.
C.

COMPETITION OPTIONS - THE TRANSATLANTIC
COMMON AVIATION AREA

As to whether there should be absolute, untrammelled competition within the Americas and between the Americas and Europe is a critical issue for the coming years. One recent
suggestion has been to crystallize a "convergence of regulatory
principles" between Europe and the United States in competition by establishing a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area
(TCAA). This concept, suggested by the Association of European Airlines (AEA) in a policy statement, 1° 3 puts forward detailed and realistic proposals regarding how to bring about an
ideal regulatory convergence between the European region and
the United States. The TCAA addresses three areas:
a) matters in which harmonization is necessary;
b) matters in which convergence could take the form of mutual
recognition; and
c) matters which could, in principle, be left at the discretion of
each party.

The TCAA concept advocates the freedom of the parties to
provide services, addresses issues pertaining to airline ownership
and the right of establishment, provides recommendations with
regard to competition policy, and offers guidelines on the leas- National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1974 (2003). The restrictions under the
banking laws of the United States are based on the nationality of the directors of
a foreign investment company and not on foreign ownership.
100 One of the most compelling elements of State control of foreign investment in the United States is based on national defense tinder the Defence Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2170 (1989).
101 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (2003).
102 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (2003). See alsoJ. Davidow, Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Antitrust Law in a Changing World, 8 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 895
(1976); P.N. Swan, InternationalAntitrust-The Reach and Efficacy of United States Law,
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103 AEROPOLITICAL NEWS, IATA, No. 744-18.11.99.
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ing of aircraft. Since the TCAA aims at replacing traditional
governmental regulatory control of aspects of competition, such
as market entry and pricing, the issues emerging from competition policy are by far the most complex and difficult to deal
with, within the parameters of the TCAA. Although the fundamental postulates of competition in Europe (as followed
through by European Union regulations) and the United States
are broadly similar in intent and both depend to a certain extent on the application of extra-territoriality in their regulations,
there are obvious differences, such as those embodied in the
different approaches to trans-Atlantic airline alliances. While
the United States stringently relies on a principle of "public interest" in its air transportation policy, European competition
rules are not as explicit. The basic essence of a TCAA would,
therefore, establish the principle that matters of route sharing,
capacity, pricing, and frequency of services should be driven by
market forces, rather than be determined by governmental intervention. In this regard a certain commonality could be established between air transport of the two regions.
Another option is to allow absolute open competition between Europe and North America. Although globalization of
competition in trade is a reality, in the case of air transport it
may be premature since the current bilateral air services negotiations structure still seems to work. Additionally, absolute
globalization of air transport will involve the question of air
transport being encompassed in the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS contains the Most
Favoured Nations (MFN) treatment clause under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which later came
within the purview of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Under the MFN clause, a GATS Member could be required, immediately and unconditionally, to accord to the services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable
than it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other
country. This is not practical since the application of the MFN
principle to international air transport would adversely affect
and hold back the ongoing process of liberalization between
like-minded States.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of the European Court must necessarily be
viewed, not for its validity or logicality, both of which are not in
question, but for its consequences. The court has clearly ruled
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that certain areas of air transport should be strictly within the
overall competency of the European Commission through the
Council.'0 4 However, the court clearly ruled that the national
prerogative of a EU Member State to initiate, negotiate, and finalize bilateral air services still remains. Issues of market access
and air traffic rights could indeed be the subject of individual
negotiation of a European Union State, provided they did not
discriminate against the equal rights enjoyed by other European
carriers. In this regard, the decision of the court was not unexpected and retained the status quo ante. This essentially means
that the existing international norms prevailing prior to the decision of the court still stand in these areas, and the market and
political forces at play will now be even more relevant.
In the field of air transport, the European Union has shown
that national prosperity is created, not inherited, and that, contrary to popular belief, a commercially successful enterprise
within a nation does not necessarily grow because of that nation's natural endowments, its cheap labour force or its currency values, but rather by the capacity of that industry to
innovate and upgrade. As the winds of change are sweeping
commercial aviation toward the new millennium, European nations have shown that, at least in air transportation, nations have
become more, not less, important. They have created competitive advantages for themselves through a highly localized
process.
States of Europe have realized that, unlike large nations such
as the United States, Canada, and Russia, individual European
States are relatively small in size. The geographic magnitude of
a country becomes a relevant consideration in air transport,
both in terms of the volume of traffic generated by a particular
country and the negotiating leverage it has in bartering air traffic rights and points of departure and landing. If a country is
small, it is usual for that country to have fewer airports than a
larger country, and the latter would consequently have more opportunity at bargaining. Therefore, incontrovertibly, European
States have to band together in order to optimize their collective
potential.
Strict European Union legislation is therefore understandable, particularly in areas such as slot allocation, computer reservation systems, fares, and rates in air transport services, which
the European Court of Justice addressed. However, this legisla104

See United Kingdom, E.C.R. 1-9427, at para. 150.
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tion should continue in product performance, product safety,
and environmental impact to promote a competitive advantage
and stimulate and upgrade domestic demand. The last element,
environmental impact, should be particularly addressed in harmony with global regulations as promulgated through the International Civil Aviation Organization. As a future measure,
European States should also continue limiting direct cooperation in the air transport field among industry rivals in order to
obviate anti-competitive conduct. As a supplemental measure,
competition should be deregulated and State monopolies,
which are already discouraged in the Union, should be eschewed. Finally, governments should vigorously pursue an open
market policy that veers away from managed trade, which has a
tendency to deal with the fallout of national competitiveness.
European airlines should continue to seek out pressure and
challenge in order to innovate commercially toward more
achievements while seeking out their most capable competitors
as motivators. More importantly, airlines of European nations
should establish early warning systems which would indicate any
hint of change in the air transport market, both within and
outside Europe. Airlines could find and serve passengers and
consignors who have the most anticipating needs, find places
whose regulations foreshadow emerging regulations elsewhere,
bring outside expertise into their management teams, and constantly conduct research on market access.
In the quest for globalization of European air transport activity, airlines should tap selectively into sources of advantage in
other nations' airlines. However, airline alliances have to be
used only selectively in order to minimize costs and obviate relinquishing profits that would accrue to an airline without the
alliance concerned. Inevitably, an airline alliance shows the
partners' mediocrity to an extent, particularly if profits are not
optimized and alliances are formed on core activities. The central theme for European nations and their airlines for the future
is "leadership" which they currently hold in air transport regulation by being second to none and equal to the best.
Regarding North America, it must be stringently maintained
that the United States, Canada, or any other country, has not, in
its pursuit of open skies, advocated the GATS umbrella. The
United States' approach has been to maintain its policy of "public interest" and to maximize air transport as a service industry
to confront the challenges of the upcoming decades. The GATS
example served only to show a certain similarity of equal oppor-
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tunity and competition under the MFN clause, which would be
reflective of the philosophy of an open skies regime, where all
States participating in an open skies policy with each other
would enjoy equal air traffic rights on a reciprocal basis.
As to the question whether the GATS negotiating scheme
should be adopted with regard to international competition policy, the main consideration should be that if such a scheme is
ever considered, it should be contemporaneous with the consideration of a scheme within the WTO for negotiating international antitrust principles. Negotiations may be on a total
harmonization or a partial harmonization basis. Such an approach would have the advantage of the possibility of introduction by members of a variety of international competition
agreements out of which they could select a suitable agreement.
Also, if this approach is adopted, it would be important for
members to have a firm commitment to promote competition
law and policy both internationally and domestically. Such commitment should be clearly declared. Also, it may be necessary to
establish, as in GATS, a time schedule within which negotiations
should be carried out.
A declaration of fundamental principles of competition would
also be necessary. This declaration should contain analogous
provisions to the most favoured nation treatment, national treatment and transparency. Consideration should also be given to
prohibition of cartels, resale price maintenance, boycotts, and
others. At the same time, caution should be given that a wide
variety of principles that are followed by Members with regard to
other areas, such as mergers and acquisitions, vertical non-price
restraint, and predatory pricing, therefore, it may be feasible to
merely declare general and abstract principles which require
Members to promote competition policy in such areas.
Although admittedly, the WTO is not the only forum in which
a scheme of convergence of competition laws can be accommodated (the OECD for example, is for every purpose an appropriate forum) there is compelling reason for such a scheme to be
considered under the WTO umbrella due to the volume of
membership that the WTO carries. Among the more than 125
States which participated in the Uruguay Round leading to the
establishment of the WTO Agreement, not all have competition
laws and many are not yet ready for such. When an international competition code is drafted, it is logical to expect a certain degree of universality in its principles and such could be
accomplished on a wider scale, given the WTO's membership.
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Professor Petersmann has recommended1 5 that an international competition code may be accommodated as an agreement of Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement, which contains
optional agreements. Petersmann examines the idea of a
smaller number of nations entering into such an agreement initially, such as the United States, Japan, and Members of the European Community, with Canada and Australia joining in. A
grace period for developing States to join the agreement has
also been addressed. He believes that, at least in the initial
stage, an international competition code among a smaller number of members may work more effectively. Such an agreement
may, according to Petersmann, address "market access" issues
effectively.
Generally, it is felt that the inclusion of an international competition code in the WTO Agreement would have the advantage
of coordination between competition policy and other policies
embodied in WTO agreements such as TRIPS, the Safeguard
Agreement, and the Antidumping Agreement. Such agreements would be accomplished easier than if a competition code
was established separately from the WTO. Another envisaged
advantage is that the dispute settlement process incorporated' in
Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement could be utilized when a dispute arises relating to the enforcement of competition laws.
Perhaps the only similarity between the competition rules of
the existing bilateral structure relating to the air services agreement and the W'TO competition rules is the insistence by both
systems on the requirement of fair and equal opportunity. The
current bilateral structure of the air services negotiations will remain in force as long as States consider, subjectively, the potential of air traffic that their carriers would have over others, by
excluding others from given market segments. This the States
can do, not only because of Article 6 of the Chicago Convention, but also by virtue of the underlying principle of sovereignty, which legally entitles a State to prohibit a carrier from
flying into or out of its territory without that State's permission.
As the preceding discussion has revealed, the protectionist attitude that pervades commercial air transport is not limited to
struggling carriers of developing nations, but also applies to
mega carriers who protect what they believe to be a legitimate
Ernst-Ulhich Petersmann, Proposals for Negotiating International Competition
Rules in the GATT-WTO World Trade and Legal System, 47 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 231,
231-77 (1996).
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share of their market. In this backdrop, the term "market access" can only be used with the word "reciprocity." The status
quo in commercial aviation is, therefore, by no means consistent
with the competition principles advocated by the WTO.
If the concept of "market access" of commercial aviation is to
be in consonance with WTO competition rules, the first step
that the aviation Community would have to take is to change its
overall philosophy and consider all international air traffic as
international property rather than national property. This calls
for a radical change in international policy regarding air traffic
rights, where individual States would be considered as having an
overall duty towards their citizens and citizens would be considered units of an international Community of nations, rather
than being considered units of that particular State. In other
words, States would represent citizens as nationals of an international society. The international traffic market would then be
taken as a whole and nations would adapt themselves to an extra-national approach in sharing international air traffic. Once
the extra-national philosophy is in place, it would not be difficult to consider extra-territoriality in competition in a manner
compatible with WTO competition rules, particularly in the context of^the latter's emphasis on uniformity. The principles of
transparency, the most favoured nation treatment, and dispute
resolution could then all fall into place.
Theoretically, the above proposal may sound logical and
workable. However, in practicality, it cannot be denied that
States have jealously guarded their historical rights to air traffic
over the past fifty-five years and would, therefore, be reluctant to
embrace a multilateral approach to enter into open competition. As to whether this trend would continue between the
Member States of the European Union and the United States
after the decision of the European Court is a matter for the
future.

